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ANALYZING THE DEBTOR'S DUE PROCESS INTEREST
DOUG RENDLE.MLAN*

In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases
challenging the constitutionality of creditors' prejudgment remedies. It
would seem that this proliferation of factually distinguishable cases would
have provided the Court with the opportunity to refine and systematize
the debtor due process concepts which were first articulated in Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.' The latest in the trilogy of post-Sniadach decisions of the Court, 2 however, indicates that systematic due process
analysis has reached an apparent dead end. In his dissent in North

Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,3 Mr. Justice Blackmun regretted the Court's abandonment of intelligible due process analysis in
favor of a "sparse comparisons" approach, recognizing that this adulterated approach destroys doctrinal purity and casts statutory remedies
for creditors into a constitutional netherworld. 4 Justice Blackmun's analysis of the majority's opinion in North Georgia appears to be entirely
correct. This article contends, however, that despite the Court's failure
to do so, the decisions can be reconciled, and that systematic due process
adjudication is not only possible, but, if a rational and socially responsive
jurisprudence is to be created, necessary.
Proper analysis is the key to due process, and this analysis should be
undertaken in a progression of steps. Since the fourteenth amendment
protects life, liberty, and property from adverse action without due
process, the necessary initial question is whether the challenged procedure adversely affects one of those constitutionally cognizable interests. After some early confusion,5 a majority of the Court rejected a
balancing test and adopted a test based upon definition of the interest
involved to determine the existence of a constitutionally cognizable interest. In Goss v. Lopez, 6 one issue was whether a student who had been
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
1.395 U.S.337 (1969).

2. As discussed infra, the post-Sniadach trilogy is Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974); and North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
3. 95 S. Cr. 719 (1975).
4. Id. at 726.
5. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972) (grievous loss balancing
test) 'with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (test based upon defi-

nition of the interest involved).
6. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
[35]
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suspended from school for ten days had an interest of sufficient magnitude to compel due process. The Court rejected the contention that
the issue should be resolved by determining whether the suspension was
long enough to be a "severe detriment or grievous loss." 8 Rather than
engaging in such a balancing process, the Court defined the interest and

found both a liberty interest in reputation and a property interest in the
opportunity to be educated. 9 Thus, the Court held that the student's
interest in being free from suspension exceeded de minimis, was constitutionally cognizable, and required procedural protection. 10 The Court
relegated the length of the suspension to a factor bearing on the form of
process due."
If no constitutionally cognizable interest is found, analysis obviously
ceases, since the fourteenth amendment mandates due process only in
the case of deprivations of those specific interests. If the Court finds a
cognizable interest present and adversely affected, then it proceeds to
the second question: What process is due? 1 2 Normally, one private
citizen cannot use state power to affect another private citizen's property
interest absent notice and an opportunity to be heard. In determining the
process due, the Court balances factors ignored in the initial defining
process, such as the pragmatic value of the procedure suggested, the
state's interest, and the severity of the deprivation.' 3 Thus, at the first
stage, the Court defines the citizen's interest to determine whether it is
7. Goss does not deal with conventional "property." Historically, due process forbade
a plaintiff from employing the legal process to deprive a defendant of an ownership interest without advance notice. The Court has recognized less palpable interests. See
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (value of. bordering river impaired
by government); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(beneficiary's right to sue trustee for breach of trust). But courts and legislatures, fearing
that defendants who received notice would dissipate or secrete assets, allowed plaintiffs
to affect property interests "temporarily" without notice. Cf. id. at 314. Due process
decisions which culminated in North Georgia brought the heretofore unexamined definition of property out of the realm of abstract conjecture and into one where immediate
and practical answers are inevitable.
8. 95 S. Ct. at 736-37.
9. ld. at 736.
10. ld. at 737.
11. "Appellees were excluded from school only temporarily, it is true, but the length
and consequent severity of a deprivation, while another factor to weigh in determining
the appropriate form of. hearing, 'is not decisive of the basic right' to a hearing of some
kind." Id. The form of process due is a subsequent step in the due process analysis.
See text following note 34 infra.
12. Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
13. See notes 33-34 infra & accompanying text.
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constitutionally cognizable; at the second, it weighs to determine how
the state may affect that interest.
In determining the presence of a constitutionally cognizable interest,
the Court, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,4 expanded traditional
concepts of protected interests to include a "use" interest. Ms. Sniadach's
wages were garnished without notice pursuant to a Wisconsin statute.15
The majority characterized wages as "a specialized type of property"
and noted that wage garnishment may "drive a wage-earning family to
the wall." "6In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan characterized the
defendant's property interest more generally: "The 'property' . . . is the
use of the garnished portion of her wages during the interim period between garnishment and the culmination of the main suit ... [T] his
deprivation cannot be characterized as de minimis. . . ." ' Thus, due
process proscribed any statute which allowed a plaintiff to affect the
defendant's use interest without notice and a hearing.
Fuentes v. Shevin' 8 further explicated the "use" concept of property
by invalidating statutes which allowed a plaintiff to require a state official to seize items from a defendant without advance notice. It was
argued that the statutes were constitutional because these items, as distinguished from the wages in Sniadach, were less than necessities of life,
were only taken temporarily, and also because plaintiff was an unpaid
seller who retained a security interest in the property. In short, the argument favoring constitutionality was that the debtor's interest was of insufficient weight. The majority responded, however, that "[a] ny significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of the Due
Process Clause"; " the Court examined the nature, not the weight, of the
interest.20 Thus, Fuentes established that due process protects "luxuries"
as well as necessities, and that although defendants may lack full "title"
their contractually established interest in possessing and using the items
between purchase and final payment was significant enough to be constitutionally cognizable.2
14. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
15. Plainly, taking part of the defendant's income when the plaintiff filed the suit improved the plaintiff's settlement leverage, interfered with the defendant's consumption,
and increased the chance that the defendant would default.
16. 395 U.S. at 340-42.
17. Id. at 342.
18. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
19. Id. at 86.
20. Id. at 89-90.
21. Lower court decisions have further expanded the list of constitutionally cognizable
interests in the use of property. Although nor displacing a debtor's "possession," attach-
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ment of a bank account was subject to procedural protections due constitutionally
cognizable "properties." See, e.g., Stuckers v. Thomas, 374 F. Supp. 178, 180 (D.S.D.
1974); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 723 (D. Conn. 1973);
Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 745 (D. Mass. 1972). Similarly, although other
prejudgment attachments merely create a lien, allowing the owner to continue use of the
property, these liens cloud titles and hinder the owner's efforts to sell or mortgage the
property. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888, 894
(M.D.N.C. 1975); Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Betting Ass'n. v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (D. Mass. 1973); In re Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., 363
F. Supp. 725, 730 (W.D. Wash. 1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l. Bank, 360 F.
Supp. 1085, 1090 (D. Me. 1973).
Although the owner may have already mortgaged the property, the equity of redemption may be his only significant asset and it may be entitled to protection. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Law v. United States
Dept. of Agric., 366 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 1973). But see In re The Oronoka,
393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975); Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997
(D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974) (rejecting interest in free alienation).
Other lien interests in real estate, like mechanics' and artisans' liens, allow the owner
to continue to possess, but deter sales and mortgages. The artisan presumably added
labor and materials roughly equivalent in value to the amount of the lien. If the lien
attaches to the value added by the artisan's work and material, interference with the
owner's interest may be de minimis. See Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.
Fla. 1974); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.S.D. 1973). See also Spielman-Fond,
Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974) (interference with right freely to alienate property not constitutionally protected).
In mechanics' liens on movable property, the owner relinquishes possession, the artisan
presumably adds labor and materials, and the claim relates to the item. The common
law possessory lien allows an innkeeper, artisan, or carrier to retain the item until the
owner pays. Statutes typically allow the artisan to keep the item and ultimately to sell
it to satisfy the debt. Courts have held that the owner lacks a constitutionally cognizable
interest which would allow him to prevent the artisan from detaining the item without
notice and a hearing. See Caeser v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (M.D.N.C. 1975);
Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491, 498 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Adams v. Dept. of Motor
Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 155, 520 P.2d 961, 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145, 150 (1974). But see
Straley v. Gassaway Motors Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (detention unconstitutional). Two factors appear to bear on this: the owner gave up possession, and the
lienor has an interest in the labor and materials he presumably added. Adams v. Dept.
of Motor Vehicles, supra at 154-55, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150. To state this
another way, the artisan and the owner have dual interests in the improved property.
This lien differs from attaching property which is unrelated to prior dealings between
the parties. The prior dealings may guarantee the genuineness of the asserted debt.
Procedure must accommodate both the owner and the improver; notice and an opportunity to be heard before the lien attaches may be too inflexible for these dual interests.
Courts therefore draw the due process line at retaining possession. Because a sale
extirpates the owner's ownership or title interest, the lienor cannot, absent notice and
an opportunity to adjudicate the debt, sell to satisfy the "debt." Caeser v. Kiser, 387
F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491, 498 (W.D.
Ky. 1974); Adams v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra at 152, 520 P.2d at 967-68, 113 Cal.
Rptr. at 151-52.
Allowing the lienor to keep the item but preventing him from selling it returns own-
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Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. 22 distinguished Fuentes and approved
Louisiana statutes which allowed a credit seller to cause government officials to repossess household items from a credit buyer without prior
notice. Difficulties confront one who would reconcile Fuentes and
Mitchell. Justice Powell thought that Mitchell withdrew significantly
from Fuentes and that, to some extent, Mitchell overruled FuentesP
Justice Brennan noted in dissent that Fuentes required a different result
in Mitchell.24 Justice Stewart, author of Fuentes, dissented, arguing that
Mitchell was "constitutionally indistinguishable" from Fuentes and was
"unmistakably overruled" because the composition of the Court had
changed.2 5
Properly understood, Mitchell turns on the answers to the multistep
analysis. To the first question, whether there was a cognizable property
interest, the majority replied that both the installment buyer, who had
paid in part, and the installment seller, who was not fully paid, had
cognizable interests. 2 Because the Court found antagonistic parties, both
of whose interests lay somewhere between ownership and de minimis,
the second inquiry into what process is due, became more difficult. The
majority, "with this duality in mind," concluded that the Louisiana procedure accommodated the adverse interests adequately.2 7 Thus, where
the interests are dual, the use interest in a chattel becomes less compelling.
Mitchell appears to govern written purchase money security interests
in real property. 28 The opinion dismissed Sniadach as involving a creditor without a prior interest in the garnished property, 29 mentioned that
ers and lienors to prestatutory common law. R. BROWN,

THE -LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

§ 119 (2d ed. 1955).
For a discussion of the application of the evolving due process analysis to possessory
liens, see Note, Possessory Liens: The Need for Separate Due Process Analysis, 16
WM. & MARY L. REv. 971 (1975).
As a tactical matter, the lienor retains considerable leverage along with the item,
but the owner cannot lose the item completely and may force the matter before an
adjudicating body.
22. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).

23. Id. at 1908-09.
24. Id. at 1914.

25. Id. at 1910-14.
26. Id. at 1898.
27. Id. at 1899. The statute required the secured creditor to allege specifically the
transaction and default before a judicial officer, and allowed the debtor to dissolve
the writ and recover damages if the creditor was unable to prove the grounds upon
which the writ was issued. See also id. at 1904-05.
28. Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditors Remedies: From Sniadach and
Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgiaand Beyond, 28 RurTGERs L. REv. 541, 557-59 (1975).
29. 94 S. Ct. at 1904.
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a "mortgage or lien holder" obtains the writ,3" and distinguished the
"fault" standard in Fuentes from the "narrowly confined" issues of
vendor's lien and default, finding the latter more appropriate for ex parte
and documentary proof.31 Beyond installment contract interests in personal property and perhaps real property, 3 it is unclear what the Court
will include in the dual interest category.
Perhaps, then, the apparent conflict between the Fuentes and Mitchell
decisions can be resolved. Mitchell merely refines the due process
multistep analysis by inserting an inquiry as to the nature of the interest,
sole or dual, between the determinations of the existence of the constitutionally cognizable interest and of the process due.
If the cognizable interests are dual, additional factors must be considered in determining the process due: verification, specificity, judicial
decision, and an opportunity to dissolve. The presence of one or more
of these factors, in the context of dual interests, increases the likelihood
of a finding of satisfaction of due process requirements.3 3 If, on the
other hand, the plaintiff is only a general or contract creditor or a potential judgment creditor, the interests are not dual. In such a case, the
defendant has the sole interest, and Fuentes controls. Absent emergency,
due process mandates notice and a hearing to affect a cognizable interest.

34

There are significant differences between a secured creditor and a
potential judgment creditor. The secured creditor has a debt plus contractually created rights in specific property; his relationship to the defendant may legitimately be called that of creditor to debtor. Even so,
it is incorrect to refer to the "defaulting" debtor for this assumes the
conclusion that a hearing is designed to reach. Many attachment cases,
however, do not grow out of ongoing contractual relationships, and to
call these defendants debtors is to assume the conclusion that they owe
debt. This is the subject of which lawsuits are made. Even if a commercial relation exists, the debtor's general property is not a fund for
collection of the debt unless the parties have taken the measures neces30. Id.
31. Id. at 1905.
32. Cf. Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1259-60 (WV.D.N.C. 1975); Garner v.
Tri-State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
33. As in Mitchell, courts will uphold statutes striking a sufficient protective balance.
If statutes provide insufficient protection for the debtor, courts will invalidate them.
Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975); Turner v. Blackburn, 389
F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377
(E.D. Mich. 1974).
34. See, e.g., Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
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sary to create a consensual security interest. While the unsecured creditor relies on the debtor's assets, the prudent creditor does not count on
an unimpeded first crack at those assets. In addition to doctrinal dual
interest consistency, then, pragmatic considerations may lead to different
constitutional treatment. Since a contract and default are easy to prove,
the prior dealings may be a guarantee that the claim is genuine. This
rationale for dispensing with notice and a hearing does not apply, however, when the plaintiff attaches property unrelated to prior dealings in
order to adjudicate a controversy unrelated.to the property.
It seems, therefore, that Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell can be integrated to create a three step due process analysis: 1) Does the debtor
possess a constitutionally cognizable interest in the disputed property?
2) Are the interests in the property sole or dual? 3) Considering the
nature of the interests, what process is due? If the interest is determined
to be a sole interest, the strict procedural requirement of Fuentes would
be mandated. If the interest is determined to be dual, the presence of
some combination of the Mitchell ameliorative factors would allow a less
rigorous procedure to pass constitutional scrutiny.
North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.35 could have been decided in a manner consistent with this three step due process analysis.
The challenged statute allowed a plaintiff to garnish a defendant's debtor
upon the filing of an affadavit stating the amount claimed and that, absent
garnishment, the plaintiff had "reason to apprehend the loss of the same
or some part thereof." 36 Pursuant to this statute, the plaintiff corporation
had attached the defendant corporation's bank account. Without extended analysis, Justice White's majority opinion invalidated the statute
on the authority of Fuentes and summarily distinguished Mitchell, evoking Justice Stewart's comment: "It is gratifying to note that my report
of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin . . . seems to have been greatly exaggerated." 37 The Court could have avoided such confusion by articulating the three step due process analysis evidenced by prior decisions
and by integrating North Georgia into this systematic approach. The
Court rejected the argument that due process prevented only consumer
garnishments, replying that the due process clause did not "distinguish
among different kinds of property." 38 In answer to the first of the three
due process inquiries, then, the Court concluded that the debtor corpo35. 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
36. Id. at 720-21.

37. Id. at 723.
38. Id.
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ration had a constitutionally cognizable interest in the use of its bank
account. 39
Instead of proceeding to the second step and analyzing for duality,
the majority merely mentioned that factors which were present in
Mitchell were absent in North Georgia: specific allegations, a judicial
decision, and an immediate postseizure hearing.4° As discussed above,
however, these factors accommodate dual interests; unless the interests
are dual, these factors may be ignored.4 In Mitchell, the interests in the
property taken ex parte were dual since both the buyer and the seller
had an established interest. In North Georgia, however, the plaintiff
seized property in which the interests were not dual. Unlike personal
property sold by installment contract, the plaintiff lacked a tangible prior
interest in the defendant's bank account. Adversary process was therefore due.
Thus, the North Georgia majority failed satisfactorily to integrate North Georgia with prior decisions.42 Justice Blackmun's
dissent reflects the intellectual discomfort many feel. More importantly,
this doctrinal dead end may stunt further articulation and development
of due process for, by ignoring the three step analysis, the majority may
recede from full protection under due process. Utilizing the North
Georgia"sparse comparisons" approach, the Court might uphold a statute
which allows a plaintiff to affect the owner's use interest in property unrelated to prior dealings simply because the statute requires various
Mitchell ameliorative factors: specific, verified allegations, a judicial decision, and a prompt opportunity to dissolve. This would repudiate the
idea that an owner has a cognizable interest in using property, 3 a concept which, beginning with Justice Harlan's concurrence44 in Sniadach,
forms a uniform thread throughout due process analysis.
39. Id. at 722.
40. Id. at 722-23.
41. See notes 33-34 supra & accompanying text.

42. Questions abound. Did Mitchell dilute Fuentes? Did Justice White, the dissenter
in Fuentes and the author of Mitchell, become converted to Fuentes in North Georgia?

Did Justice White understand what dual interests imply? If Justice Stewart applied the
two step analysis in Fuentes, why did he fail to explain it in either Mitchell or North
Georgia?
It should be noted that although this article contends that existence of a sole interest
mandates the procedural protections of Fuentes, see text following note 33 supra, it is not

alleged that Fuentes is an example of a sole interest. To this extent, Mitchell can be
read as a retreat from Fuentes.

43. This appears to be Justice Powell's view. See 95 S. Cr. at 724 (concurring opinion).
44. If there is no general interest in using property, then there may be social class
lines in determining who is entitled to due process. Justice Powell, 95 S. Ct. at 724,

19751

DEBTOR DUE PROCESS

The Court in North Georgia could have avoided this problem by simply finding no duality of interests and by striking down the statute for
failure to comply with Fuentes-type due process. The Court, instead,
appeared to examine the procedure, and then, stating that it looked more
like Fuentes than Mitchell, invalidated the statute. Lower court cases
have followed North Georgia's "sparse comparisons" approach. They
fail to follow the three step analysis and erroneously consider the presence in the disputed procedure of Mitchell ameliorative factors when the
45
interest affected is a sole interest.
If the Mitchell factors are considered where the interests are not dual,
courts may strain to approve procedures which allow plaintiffs to affect
an interest in using property without notice to the defendant and an opportunity to be heard. 46 A three judge district court, for example, recently upheld a Tennessee statute which authorized the attachment or
garnishment of the assets of a defendant who could not be found to be
served. 7 After a deputy sheriff returned in personam notice five times
stating that the defendant could not be found after search, the plaintiff
without notice garnished the defendant's wages.48 Since no dual interest
appears, the court should have upset the procedure without pursuing the
Justice Blackmun, 95 S. Ct. at 728-29. See also Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of ProceduralDue Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807
(1975).
45. Bunton v. First National Bank, 394 F. Supp. 793 (M.D. Fla. 1975); In re The
Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975); Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 392 F. Supp.
1385 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888
(M.D.N.C. 1975); Douglas Research and Chemical, Inc. v. Solomon, 388 F. Supp. 433
(E.D. Mich. 1975); Manning v. Palmer, 381 F. Supp. 713 (D. Ariz. 1974); Sugar v.
Curtis Circ. Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3545
(U.S. April 15, 1975).
46. See Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
Also, if a court disapproves a statute merely because the statute lacks an immediate
postseizure hearing, the result is correct but the legislature may remedy only that
defect.
47. Maxwell v. Hixson, 383 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
48. Yet the defendant both lived and worked in the county. Id. at 321-22. Thus,
the problem was created by lack of official diligence, not a fleeing or hiding defendant.
The proper course of wisdom is to encourage the sheriff to do better in the future,
not to seize defendant's assets without adversary procedure. See Wyatt, Arnercernent
of Sheriffs, 10 WAKE FoRsr L. REV. 237 (1974)

(discussion of statutory penalty for

failure to execute and return writs and processes). Nor is seizure the answer to the
general problem of the absconding or simply missing defendant; a discerning application of the rules of in personam service will solve almost all problems. Louis, Modern
Statutory Approaches to Service of Process Outside the State, 49 N. CAR. L. REV. 235
"(1971). See also Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,1965 SuP. CT.

REv. 241, 287-88.
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Mitchell analysis. Rather, it read Mitchell to limit Sniadach and Fuentes
and to strengthen the earlier rule which approved ex parte attachment
when necessary to acquire jurisdiction. It noted that it was "somewhat
of an anomaly" to require notice where the defendant cannot be found.49
Other courts have upheld attachment to secure jurisdiction over a nonresident's assets, reasoning that the ex parte attachment both secures
jurisdiction and immures a fund to satisfy some or all of the plaintiff's
judgment. 50
Perceptive commentators have soundly condemned quasi in rem jurisdiction or attaching or garnishing assets to adjudicate unrelated claims.
Such jurisdiction is, they argue, superannuated, mechanical, and profoundly unfair. 51 Quasi in rem jurisdiction, by allowing a plaintiff without notice to immure property unrelated either to the controversy or to
prior dealings between the parties, is clearly a violation of the due process
analysis established, although not articulated, by the Supreme Court in
decisions culminating in North Georgia.52
The Supreme Court will again have an opportunity to articulate this
three step due process analysis in an upcoming review of an attachment
case. In granting review of Sugar v. Curtis CirculationCo.,5 the question decided to be heard was: "Does such statute satisfy due process to
extent it permits attachment of property in which plaintiff does not have
vendor's lien or similar statutory lien?" 54 If the Court employs the
three step analysis, it will conclude that due process, properly understood, precludes a plaintiff from sequestering a defendant's assets merely
to obtain jurisdiction.
49. 383 F. Supp. at 325. "Suffice it to say a public officer's dereliction in performing
his statutory duties does not thereby render the statute unconstitutional." Id.
50. Usdan v. Dunn Paper Co., 392 F. Supp. 953 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Stanton v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 388 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Baiter v. Bato Co., 385 F.
Supp. 420 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
51. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 142-47 (1971); Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction,76 HARV. L. REv. 303 (1962).
52. An alternative to such due process violations exists. As courts striking down
exercises of quasi in rem jurisdiction recognize, in personam jurisdiction is almost
alvays available through a long arm statute. See, e.g., Welsh v. Kinchla, 386 F. Supp.
913 (D. Mass. 1975); In re Law Research Services, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749, 755 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). While Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell contain citations to earlier attachment
cases, a trenchant note reveals the narrow historical basis for these earlier decisions and
destroys their continuing intellectual foundation. Note, Quasi in Rent Jurisdiction and
Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023 (1973).
53. 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S.
April 15, 1975).
54. Curtis Circ. Co. v. Sugar, 43 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. April 15, 1975).
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CONCLUSION

Courts cannot substitute haphazard comparisons for systematic reasoning and create a rational and socially responsive jurisprudence. This
article contends that proper due process analysis employs a three step
approach. The first inquiry is whether the interest affected is constitutionally cognizable as property. If it is not, analysis ceases and the interest
may be affected absent due process protections. If a constitutionally
cognizable interest is found, the nature of the interest must be examined.
If the interest is sole, the Constitution compels advance notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the interest is affected. If the interests
are dual, then the Mitchell ameliorative factors are analyzed to determine
if the challenged procedure strikes a sufficient protective balance to accommodate the interests of both debtor and creditor. If due process is
to attain its intellectual potential and carry out its social function, courts
should repudiate the sparse comparisons approach and follow the three
step, dual interest analysis.

